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It is my thesis today that we need to reexamine the definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. The traditional inquiry into what activ-
ities constitute the unauthorized practice of law is largely, if not whol-
ly, misguided. What is needed is a whole new mode of analysis. Be-
cause we are asking the wrong questions, we are getting answers
unacceptable to the way our society operates today.
However, before asking about the unauthorized practice of law,
we ought to look into the "authorized" practice of law, commonly
known as bar admissions. Why do we have bar admissions? What are
we trying to protect? First, we are worried about competence; second,
about integrity; and third about the loyalty to the client. Those are the
generally perceived components of bar admissions.
For the first component we have examinations and educational ex-
perience requirements. For the second we have character investigations.
And third, we have an ongoing Code of Professional Responsibility by
which lawyers are supposed to guide their actions. The purpose of all
of these is to protect the public, not to enable lawyers to protect them-
selves from competition. This protection of the public is, I think we
have to acknowledge, a form of paternalism. We are saying to the pub-
lic that the cost of having a lawyer is not a relevant consideration. For
those areas which we say are exclusively the province of the lawyer, no
matter how significant the cost may be, you the public have to have a
lawyer if you are going to have someone help you at all.
Are there any limits to what the courts have said about how to
stately define the practise of law? In the United States Supreme Court
case of Ferguson v. Scrupa,' the Supreme Court said that state deter-
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minations on these matters are not subject to attack under the due pro-
cess clause. While that ruling antedates many of the recent first amend-
ment cases under which advertising restrictions were successfully struck
down, it seems to me that the first amendment attack on the practice
of law will not be a successful one.
A few years ago the Supreme Court in the Feretta2 case said that
in the area of criminal law, any person has a constitutional right to
defend himself. But the courts have consistently held that a defendant
does not have a constitutional right to have someone other than a law-
yer defend him/her. 3
One of the few cases in which the Supreme Court or any other
court has held unauthorized practice to be unconstitutional is Johnson
v. A very.4 In that decision the Court ruled that prison authorities could
not discipline inmates for acting as writ writers where there were no
other facilities available, and where there were no lawyers readily avail-
able to handle their grievances. Other than in that narrow area there
have been very few successful attacks. The only other one of which I
am aware is Sperry v. Florida,' in which the Supreme Court ruled that
where the United States Patent Office, pursuant to a congressional
statute, ruled that persons other than lawyers may prepare patent ap-
plications, the state of Florida could not, because of the doctrine of
federal preemption, exclude that kind of activity under the guise of reg-
ulating the unauthorized practice of law. There have also been a few
other rulings in the area, where the Internal Revenue authorities have
established similar kinds of authorization. But other than those isolated
situations, whatever a state does through its courts or its legislature is,
by and large, immune from constitutional attack.
There is one other federal challenge to the unauthorized practice
of law rules under the anti-trust laws. In Surety Title Insurance
Agency v. Virginia State Bar' the district court ruled that the bar itself,
as opposed to a court, cannot define or attempt to define what consti-
tutes the practice of law. Although this decision was reversed on other
2. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
3. See e.g. U.S. v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976).
4. 395 U.S. 483 (1969).
5. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
6. 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 98 S.Ct. 2838 (1978).
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grounds, it is generally conceived to have a sound analytical frame-
work. The court said that kind of activity would be an attempt to mo-
nopolize and a group boycott, especially in light of the bar's inclination
to define the practice of law as broadly as possible to prevent
competition.
There is perhaps one other application of the anti-trust laws which
has not been brought but which I suppose some day the Justice Depart-
ment will get around to bringing, and that is to the so called principals
which the American Bar Association has entered into with various
other professions such as the title insurance companies, banks, trust
companies, and so forth. I like to refer to those as territorial truces in
which the various professions have divided up the world and decided
who can compete with whom in what area. It seems to me that if any-
one got around to looking at those agreements they would probably be
viewed as horizontal territorial divisions, and hence in violation of the
anti-trust laws. We in the District of Columbia have abrogated those
principal agreements on the grounds that we didn't want to subject
ourselves to any liability. I don't know if those agreements are still
being enforced elsewhere, but they continue to remain. Nonetheless the
bottom line is that states are by and large free to decide what consti-
tutes the practice of law, at least as far as federal law is concerned.
I want to emphasize, however, that even in the few cases in which
unauthorized practice rules have been stricken, the courts have not said
that lawyers may not engage in those activities under review. The only
thing they have said is that you can't keep others from engaging in
such activities. For example, no one would contend that writing a fire
code is a matter which only lawyers can do. On the other hand, no one
would suggest that lawyers ought to be excluded from those allowed to
write such codes. The real question before us is the question of exclu-
sivity. That is, what belongs to the lawyers and only to the lawyers, or
how has the practice of law been defined?
One definition is that the practice of law is anything usually done
by lawyers. As Chesterfield Smith once said to me, "The practice of
law is anything my client will pay me to do." I suppose that in my
case, that would include riding on airplanes, sitting in court, doing my
own filing, my own xeroxing, things that Chesterfield probably doesn't
have to do in his practice, but which we have to do in ours. But even
that is, of course, a little broad. Somebody has said, "it is anything
that lawyers and only lawyers usually do." I don't think you have to be
r T
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very astute to see the question begging nature of that kind of definition.
It does, however, seem to me that the cases and the definitions such as
they are, have broken down into three separate areas. I intend to look
at each area; representation in court, drafting of legal documents, and
giving legal advice; and see when the questions asked make sense and
when they don't.
Perhaps the classic example of lawyer's work is representing
someone in a courtroom because that is how the public perceives the
lawyer. Yet there are many exceptions to this. The most common, of
course, is the right of pro se representation, which is, by and large,
guaranteed by the constitutions of most states. In the few states where
it is not guaranteed by constitution, it has grown up in practice without
recent challenge. However, this right doesn't apply if you happen to be
a corporation. Corporations are not generally entitled to pro se repre-
sentation. Attempted equal protection challenges to this rule have usu-
ally failed. The courts have almost universally said that a corporation
is different from an individual. While there is general concurrence with
this distinction, no one quite agrees why that should make any differ-
ence in this particular context. And when we are dealing with corpora-
tions that are little more than legal fictions under which mom and pop
run their grocery store, one wonders why they should not be entitled to
represent themselves in court.
The Virginia State Bar went so far as to attempt to say that cor-
porations could not even use their own house counsel to represent them
in court because that would violate the rule on corporate representa-
tion. They have since backed down on that, even as a proposal. More-
over the Virginia rules changed in response to the Surety Title case I
mentioned earlier, and now the Virginia bar can no longer issue nega-
tive opinions as to what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law;
that is, they cannot prohibit questionable activities pending approval by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. They have to go through fairly compli-
cated procedures to get to the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the
procedures have been in effect for about a year and a half now and
they haven't got the first set of opinions up to the Supreme Court yet.
I'm not so sure that the Supreme Court of Virginia is going to like the
idea of having to review all these opinions when they come up, but that
is quite another matter.
In any event, these equal protection claims on behalf of corpora-
tions, have not succeeded thus far. There is one small ray of hope, at
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least where the corporations are non-profit organizations that are, like
the American Civil Liberties Union-or like our organization, exercising
their first amendment associational rights. We believe in this area the
unauthorized practice of law rules may run afoul, not of the equal pro-
tection clause so much, as the First Amendment freedom of association
clause.
Beyond courtroom representation, there are a series of cases in-
volving representation in administrative agency proceedings. Courts
took the traditional view that litigation is litigation whether you are in
the courthouse or before an administrative agency. The cases first
arose in the area of workmen's compensation, and I think it is not
unfair to suggest that many of the motives of the bar were pecuniary
rather than protective in nature. Lawyers saw that they were losing
business to lay persons who were representing workers in compensation
cases and they didn't like it. I might also say that the courts didn't
much like it either. They said that it is irrelevant that the legislature
tried to get these cases out of court. The locus of the service, said the
court in one case, is irrelevant. I suggest that that kind of response is
irrelevant too and that the question ought to be whether having a law-
yer is necessary for the protection of the public; and I remain uncon-
vinced that it is.
Now, however, I think that the cases and practices are more ac-
cepting that lay persons can represent others before administrative
agencies, in the labor area in arbitrations, and in the governmental em-
ployee area in connection with grievances. Many contracts, indeed
some statutes, specifically provide for representation by persons who
are not lawyers. Furthermore, when the lay person is appearing on be-
half of a non-profit association, the constitutional arguments I men-
tioned earlier are even stronger in the context of an administrative
agency, particularly where the proceeding is more legislative than judi-
cial in both of functions and format.
The last area where representation is often pressed by lawyers is
the legislative area. Yet no authority of which I am aware says that
because you are "representing" a client of one kind or another before a
legislative body, you must be a member of the bar. Indeed, the oppo-
site is usually the case. Ironically, the legislative representation may be
far more important to the client than any court case that will ever
arise, and yet it is perfectly all right for non-lawyers to provide such
representation.
367 1
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Speaking of the term, "non-lawyer," every time I use it I ask my-
self about it. If you go home at night and find your house full of water,
you call a plumber. But if you wanted to call somebody else who is not
a plumber, would you ever refer to him or her as a non-plumber? Or
would you refer to someone else as a non-doctor, or a non-dentist? The
only people who manage to divide the world into their profession and
everbody else's by putting a "non" in front of them, are lawyers. So I
will try, although I don't know that I can succeed, not to use that term
here today.
The rationale behind these representation exclusions extends be-
yond the protection of the client. It is said that we need to insure that
lawyers are doing the representing because that's the way to assure that
we have orderly and speedy proceedings and thereby protect the inde-
pendent interests of the courts. I suggest to you that that reasoning, if
not wholly specious, is at least vastly overrated. In my view, we ought
to start with the premise that the courts exist for the benefit of the
people and not vice versa. Only if we can show that allowing persons
other than lawyers to represent clients in court would, in fact, impede
significantly the interest of other litigants, should we say that the inter-
ests of the courts are important. Since we already allow pro se repre-
sentation, the question to be asked is, "will it be any worse if we allow
persons who may be knowledgeable, although not trained as lawyers,
to help out people who are pro se?" As far as I know, there has been
no showing anyplace that allowing friends to come in and help out per-
sons in courtroom proceedings is going to produce any sort of signifi-
cant delay. I should think that those who are urging this proposition
ought to have the burden of showing that that kind of delay will occur.
A second point about lay representation is that these cases, by and
large, are simple cases. We're not talking about patent litigation, con-
struction litigation, anti-trust suits, or securities fraud cases. We are
talking about very simple cases which don't usually require the skills of
a lawyer. We aren't talking about situations with complex motions, a
plethora of discovery, and detailed procedural maneuvering. To say
that lay persons can't conduct anti-trust class action litigation, doesn't
answer the question of whether, in most of the cases we are talking
about, it makes any sense to say that lay persons cannot be of
assistance.
Finally, if we are really concerned about insuring that the client is
making a rational choice in being represented by a lay person, the
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judge can say to the client, "Do you understand that you have the right
to a lawyer? Whether you can afford one or not is a matter for you to
determine, but you should know that this person is not an attorney."
The judge can say, in a neutral setting, "Think about it." But despite
this alternative for dealing with lay assistance, the courts have simply
looked the other way.
The consequence of all this is, in general, twofold. Either the case
is not brought at all because the pergon is simply frightened of the
courts and won't go in by himself, or he brings the case and loses. Of
corse, lay representation won't guarantee a different result, but it may
help.
In realistic terms the option is not whether it is desirable to hire
an attorney, because most people recognize that in most situations law-
yers will provide better representation. The problem is they simply
can't afford one. It is rather like the familiar famous saying of Anatole
France: "the rich and poor alike are equally forbidden to sleep under
the bridges of Paris." That's the problem here.
I don't mean to suggest that the courts and other litigants don't
have an interest in seeing that the procedures are orderly and con-
ducted in a fair matter. My point is that this interest is often vastly
overstated. What is needed is a re-evaluation of the rules regarding lay
representation, particularly at the administrative level, where the theo-
retical goal is to provide a speedy, inexpensive remedy. It simply
makes no sense to impose a requirement adding lawyers who will be
neither inexpensive nor speedy.
The second general area in which the practice of law has been held
to be exclusive is the preparation of legal documents, such as wills,
trusts, deeds and merger agreements. The line seems to be drawn, not
at drafting of model or sample documents, but at particularization;
that is, trying to draft a particular document for a particular situation.
The problem with this analysis is that it proves too much. Because eve-
rything we do has legal consequences, every document can be seen as a
legal document with legal significance and effects. When you file a
credit card application, certain rights are established and waived. Hos-
pital admission forms typically purport to establish legal rights and
remedies. When a tenant writes a landlord about repairs, it is a docu-
ment with legal significance. Acceptance of a check from an insurance
company by signing it may constitute a waiver of all kinds of rights
that you thought you had. The result is that the lines on legal docu-
1 4:1980 The Unauthorized Practice of Law 369 1
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ments have been drawn in irrational ways.
For those of you who are either home owners or in the real estate
business, you know that the single key document in the purchase of a
house is the contract to buy. Yet virtually every state allows that docu-
ment to be prepared by a real estate broker, or by anybody else. Yet
the deed to the property, about which you may be able to do almost
nothing because you've lost or waived all your rights in the contract,
can only be drawn by a lawyer. Similarly, insurance companies or in-
dependent agents prepare the most complicated contracts with all kinds
of waivers on this and that. But when it comes to filling in a release
form to settle a two hundred dollar automobile accident claim, there
are cases which have held that only a lawyer can prepare that docu-
ment because its much too important to be left in the hands of mere
laymen.
Now, in part, this pattern is a concession to the shortness of life.
Contrary to popular assumption, lawyers are not ubiquitous, or if they
are, the average citizen can't afford to have one looking over his or her
shoulder everytime they sign a piece of paper. It is not bad that law-
yers are not involved in all these situations. The problem is that the
lines are not drawn on the grounds of complexities, as evidenced by the
deed which an attorney (or a secretary) must do even if it means simp-
ly filling in the blanks. To say that that kind of work must come from
a lawyer's office, as opposed to a bank, a title insurance office, or a
real estate broker's office, simply doesn't make any sense.
The cases have taken another approach in response to this prob-
lem: if the drawing of the legal document is incidental to another line
of business, then it will be permitted. Therefore, the real estate broker
can draw the contract for the house, in part because that's the way he
is going to get his fee, and the title insurance company is sometimes
allowed to draw some of the settlement documents because that's what
the title company is insuring against, and it wants to be sure they are
drawn properly.
Yet, these cases, as I see them, seem to constitute little more than
a rationalization for territorial truces between the warring professions.
One can hardly discern any sensible pattern in them, particularly in
terms of the complexity of the work undertaken or the risk involved.
Indeed in most of these cases, we have situations in which complexities
seem to be the opposing factor rather than the supporting factor; par-
ticularly when deciding whether a title company can do something or a
1370 4:1980 1
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real estate broker can do something, both of whom are, by and large,
knowledgeable in the area.
Now, once again, I don't contend that there are not some docu-
ments which should be drawn only by attorneys. What I am saying is
that the way we decide which ones are solely the province of lawyers is,
in a phrase, intellectually bankrupt.
In a wonderful case in the Virginia Supreme Court in 1947, Com-
monwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc.,7 Chief Judge Holt, in his dissent to
an opinion which said that only lawyers can prepare deeds, quoted
Humpty Dumpty in Alice In Wonderland and said "anything I say it
is, it is." He then went on to observe that, no matter how hard the
Supreme Court tried to make it so, to shuck corn is not to practice
law. I don't know if we have any opinions in which the shucking of
corn has been held to be the practice of law, but we are coming close.
And I suggest to you that the time is now to start looking realistically,
and not legalistically, at the question of who may draft what kinds of
documents.
Now then, let me turn to the third area: the giving of legal advice.
Before I do that, let me raise another question, which arises most fre-
quently in this part of the definition of the practice of law. Do you have
to be paid for what you have done in order to be guilty of the unautho-
rized practice of law? While the element of compensation is present in
most other areas, it is most prominent in the giving of legal advice.
Compensation alone is not enough to trigger guilt, as the selling of
legal forms in the five and dime store demonstrates. Of course, there is
an old adage that there is no such thing as a free lunch and that is true
in the giving of legal advice. Yet, if compensation is an element, it is
often very hard to prove and would pose inordinate burdens in many
cases. For this reason, in most jurisdictions, the fact that compensation
is given or not given is legally irrelevant. It obviates problems of proof,
and, I must confess, it is consistent with the notion that we are protect-
ing the person from getting bad advice, not saving the profession from
competition.
Yet I have an uneasy feeling that there is an element of overkill
here. What the rules of unauthorized practice of law are primarily try-
ing to prohibit is the charlatan who is preying upon innocent people,
not the neighbor who simply wants to give you some friendly advice.
7 186 Va. 30. 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).
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The compensation problem seems to me to be further proof of the irra-
tional rigidity of the present rules.
Returning to the question of what is legal advice, one finds that it
is rather like the question of what is a legal document. It's too broad.
So the question has been refined somewhat. Legal advice is advice as to
the legal consequences of a course of action on which the recipient re-
lies to determine his or her course of conduct. Now I suppose one
could say that when law professors, or perhaps bar review teachers, are
giving advice as to what constitutes the law, they are giving legal ad-
vice too. But no one has suggested that to be a law professor you have
to be admitted to the bar of your state. Indeed, I know one esteemed
law school in which there are members of the faculty who are not ad-
mitted to practice anyplace, even though they are graduate lawyers.
And there are some members of the faculty who aren't even law school
graduates. So, the general giving of opinions on the state of the law is
not sufficient.
What has been deemed unauthorized practice has been giving par-
ticular advice about particular legal consequence. To test that ap-
proach, let's pose a problem. I am driving down the highway doing 55
mph and there's a large truck in front of me doing 54 mph. I'm riding
with my wife, and she says to me, "Pass that truck." I say to her "I
can't, I am now at the legal speed limit." She says to me "Oh yes you
can. You may exceed the speed limit to pass the truck as long as you
resume the speed limit once you have passed the truck and gone back
into your lane." Is she practicing law? After all, she has given me par-
ticularlized advice as to the legal consequences of a transaction on
which I am relying to determine my conduct and for which I may go to
jail or lose my driver's license if she is wrong.
Or take a comparable situation in the medical area. I go home at
Thanksgiving to visit my parents and my Aunt Gertrude is there. I feel
just rotten. My Aunt Gertrude says to me, "What you need to do is to
go to bed and take lots of fruit juice and aspirin, and sleep it off." If
my doctor would tell me exactly the same thing, does that mean my
Aunt Gertrude is practicing medicine without a license? And is that
any different from my wife practicing law without a license in the other
case, and if so, why?
Take a look at the tax area, and I don't mean simply filling in
income tax returns. I'm talking about tax advice and planning. Ac-
countants give tax advice. Life insurance agents give tax advice. Stock
1372
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brokers advise you on the tax ramifications of transactions. Your
banker may tell you the tax consequences of certain transactions.
Surely, the vast industry of pension advisers is giving lots of tax advice.
What they are telling you is, if you do it this way you get the benefits
of the law, and if you do it that way, you don't get the benefits. Are
these people practicing law without a license? Well, maybe yes and
maybe no.
Take the Rosemary Furman8 case, for instance. Leaving aside the
question of whether Ms. Furman, in typing divorce papers, was prepar-
ing legal documents, let's just take the easier situation before she types
anything where people come into her office, and say to her, "I would
like a dissolution of my marriage." The first question she asks, and the
first question on the form she now uses is, "How long have you been a
resident of Florida." Now, does she give a legal opinion when she de-
cides what constitutes residence and is that the same as domicile? Is
she giving legal advice when she tells someone she or he may or may
not get a divorce at that time?
I suggest to you that when we're trying to ask questions about
what constitutes legal advice under these circumstances, we cannot
come up with any sensible answers. We tried, in Ms. Furman's case, to
get the court to back off a little bit from where it had come from in the
past. We made a constitutional argument which, both in the original
brief, and on rehearing, the court decided by refusing to respond at all.
We argued that for indigents and others who cannot afford lawyers, for
a dissolution of marriage which is a state controlled monopoly, the de-
cisions in Boddie v Connecticut' (saying you can't require filing fees for
divorces), and Johnson v. A very'" (the prisoner unauthorized practice
case), do not permit a state to require an unaffordable lawyer instead
of an affordable legal secretary. In our view the state can no more
preclude Rosemary Furman and others from providing that legal assis-
tance than it can preclude prisoners from providing writ writing assis-
tance to their inmates. We lost that case, and we are now going to take
it on to the Supreme Court."
Last, let me suggest one other area where legal advice is given all
8. Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1979).
9. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
10. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
11. On Feb. 19, 1980, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
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the time. Ann Landers has a column. Undoubtedly you have seen it.
She probably practices medicine but on this occasion she was in the
legal business. She received a letter in which the writer said "My hus-
band and I fly around together a lot on airplanes. We don't have a will.
We got to thinking the other day when we got in the middle of a bad
windstorm, what would happen if the plane went down and we were
both killed? Are the godparents of our child legally responsible for
bringing her up? And if they aren't, what would happen?" Ann Landers
replied "No, the godparents are not legally responsible. If you die in-
testate, the child will probably be brought up by relatives. But you
ought to have a will." Is she giving legal advice? She has certainly told
people what she thinks the law is. Is she practicing law without a li-
cense? And if so, in what jurisdiction? Well, the problem lies not with
the answers but with the questions. What we need are new questions
that relate to the reasons that we license attorneys in the first place.
Consider the electrician who comes to your home. Do we require
an electrician to change a light bulb? No. Do we require an electrician
to do the somewhat more complicated operation of changing a fuse?
No. How about if you want to put a new fixture in your dining room?
Do we require an electrician to do that? No. How about if you want to
rewire your house? The answer is, in most cases, that you cannot do it
yourself. The state says that's against the law. No matter how much
you want to, you cannot do it, and that rule plainly overrides your free
choice and your economic considerations. It overrides it because there
is an implicit judgment in it, that the risks of harm, in terms of a
major fire, are so great, and the likelihood of success by most lay per-
sons is so small, that cost and free choice are simply no longer
relevant.
Take my Aunt Gertrude agai If instead of prescribing rest,
chicken soup, aspirin and fruit juice, she said, "What you need is open
heart surgery performed by me." We would all recoil because the like-
lihood of her succeeding is so small and the risk of harm to me is so
great, that my free choice in that case, even if I consented before every-
one in the world, is irrelevant. The state would say no, Aunt Gertrude
may not perform that operation on me.
Now even these questions, of course, eliminate the important ele-
ment of cost. Cost is related to, but in a way different from, questions
of free choice. For instance, driving across the country, you are surely
more likely to arrive safely in a 1979 Rolls Royce than you would in a
Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
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1940 Studebaker. Yet no one has suggested that everyone has to have a
Rolls Royce to drive across country. Even if lawyers are the equivalent
of Rolls Royces (and I think most people think they are more
equivalent to Studebakers), there are some situations in which society
should let people drive Studebakers. In my view, an individual should
be able to choose secretaries, real estate brokers, accountants or
whatever, instead of having to use lawyers, unless there is a very good
reason why free choice and added cost must be imposed for the protec-
tion of the individual.
This question of when to limit free choice and when to impose
additional cost on individuals is, I think, a rather subjective question.
It involves a policy orientated question that is very heavily value laden.
It is not the kind of question which courts normally address by apply-
ing the law to the facts, and it surely is not a legal question in the sense
of interpreting the meaning of a statute, contract or other document. It
is the type of judgment which is typically made by legislatures and not
by courts. Leaving aside the question of whether the legislature in a
particular state has the power to change the rules defining the practice
of law, I suggest to you that the judgment is much more legislative
than judicial in nature. In fact, the legislatures do this kind of judging
in a number of areas involving the legal profession, but it generally has
been to add to those areas which are the exclusive province of the law-
yer. The problem, of course, is that the legislature cannot, or will not,
look at these problems on a unified and widespread basis.
What is needed, I suggest, is a quasi legislative agency, and in
fact, the courts may now be acting as such. I think this is what the
Supreme Court of Florida did in the Brumbaugh" case when it drew
the lines in the area of assisting persons seeking to attain dissolution of
marriage in the form of allowing written but not oral communications
between clients and secretaries trying to help them.
The problem is that these issues are arising with increasing fre-
quency and are imposing great burdens upon the courts. Judges are by
and large not selected because they are representative of broad spec-
trums of interest, or because they are trained or otherwise qualified to
make policy judgments. The courts are, moreover, not set up to issue
rules that have wide ranging effects, in part because there is little public
input into the process. Indeed, in the Brumbaugh case the Florida Bar
12. Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (1978).
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never had an opportunity to really address the issue, because Ms.
Brumbaugh was appearing pro se and yet, in that very narrow context,
the court issued an extremely broad rule that effected virtually every-
body in Florida.
As I indicated earlier, the bar plainly cannot take on this task
because of its own conflicts of interest and economic self-interest in the
area. What we need, I suggest, is a new body, established by the legis-
lature, which has as its component parts three separate institutional
interests. One is the interest of the bar, which has a major role to play;
second, is the interest of consumers of legal services, who have a very
important say in the matter; and third, is a group that I broadly refer
to as competitors-title insurance companies, real estate brokers, ac-
countants-who would be performing alternative services, if allowed, in
competition with services offered by the bar. This mini-legislature
would, I suggest, be able to take into account all of the relevant fac-
tors, and to issue rules which would ultimately be subject to judicial
review. It would be directed to balance the competing interests under a
general standard that would call for a balancing of the risk of harm
and the likelihood of success on the one hand, against the right of free
choice and the added cost on the other. This question is ultimately a
practical or policy question, not a "legal" one that the courts are read-
ily able to handle. Moreover, what is needed is flexibility and not rigid-
ity, a further reason for taking this function away from courts who rely
so heavily on precedent.
On first thought the answers to the questions in particular cases
will not be easy. They will not be automatic simply because we are
asking the right questions of an appropriate constitutional body. On
the other hand, we will never come up with sensible answers, until at
least we start asking sensible questions.
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